A key challenge to integrating unmanned aerial systems (UASs) into the National Airspace is providing a means for UASs to sense and avoid (SAA) other aircraft. Additionally, successful applications of a SAA system will depend on the degree to which the operator understands the rationale for its maneuvers/decision aids and can interact with the system to tailor and/or override the automation. This paper describes two interface prototypes for the Jointly Optimal Collision Avoidance (JOCA) SAA system that differed in feedback provided on the algorithm's state and planned maneuvers. Results from an operator-in-the-loop simulation are also presented. Although performance was generally similar with both interface types, the participants rated their ability to maintain safe separation from other aircraft and overall situation awareness as better with the interface that provided more visibility into the SAA algorithm's intent.
INTRODUCTION
Unmanned aerial vehicles systems (UASs) are becoming an increasingly critical aspect of military operations and are starting to be considered for civilian applications as well (DoD, 2007) . As such, it is becoming important to consider multi-UAS control and methods for the safe integration of UAS into the National Air Space (NAS). One major challenge is providing UAS with the ability to sense and avoid (SAA) other aircraft. This involves detecting traffic that may be in conflict, evaluating flight plans, determining traffic right-ofway, and exercising the appropriate maneuver according to the right-of-way rules and what will avoid collision hazards. SAA systems, as well as their associated interfaces, have been identified as a research gap by the SAA Science & Research Panel (SARP; Cook & Davis, 2013) .
Technology development is underway to provide UAS SAA capabilities (e.g., Hottman, Hansen, & Berry, 2009; Muraru, 2010; Tadema, 2011; Holt, 2012) . Many SAA systems are considered to be highly autonomous, with little requirement for human interaction. However, if UASs are to operate in NAS similar to manned aircraft, then pilot oversight is required to fulfill the intent for pilots to see and avoid other aircraft. Operator intervention must also be enabled because autonomous systems can fail.
Providing observability and directability with respect to the SAA system is also desirable (Woods & Hollnagel, 2006) . For an SAA application, this means providing transparency into the SAA's automated processes for the operator to oversee the decisions made and gain insight into the automation's competence and performance in different situations. Support for observability, in turn, helps the pilot maintain an appropriate level of trust in the SAA system (Lee & See, 2004) , as well as determine when intervention is required. Support for directability requires an intuitive and efficient interface by which the pilot can modify or override the automated maneuver or tailor the thresholds and criteria used in the algorithms that determine maneuvers. This paper will describe two prototype instantiations of an SAA interface, each providing a different level of observability into collision avoidance maneuvers. Additionally, an operator-in-the-loop experiment will be presented that collected performance and subjective data with both prototypes in a multi-UAS simulation. Finally, recommendations are provided on additional interface functionality to consider for interface design and evaluation that may improve operator-SAA system coordination.
SENSE AND AVOID (SAA) SYSTEM EMPLOYED
The autonomous routines developed in the Air Force Research Laboratory's Jointly Optimal Collision Avoidance (JOCA) program were employed as they are a representative SAA approach that weighs maneuvers based on course deviation, intruder range, right-of-way rules, data reliability, etc. (Anderson, Hoffler, & Verstynen, 2012) . JOCA was designed to monitor for potential conflicts with other aircraft in the airspace and provide avoidance steering, while minimizing deviations, if possible, from the vehicle's air traffic control corridor. Its operating domain falls somewhere between flight planning for deconfliction, and last-ditch auto aircraft avoidance algorithms. JOCA relies on fused sensor data for intruder positions and velocities as its input; sensors are typically some combination of radar and electro-optical (EO), potentially including Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS), Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) and Automatic Dependent Surveillance -Broadcast (ADS-B) (for cooperative intruder avoidance). JOCA is also provided with constant updates to the ownship's state, along with a subset of waypoints describing the vehicle's immediate flight plan.
JOCA is designed to be utilized in any airspace where the potential for air traffic conflicts exists. The "intruder" vehicles may be any type of aircraft, and therefore could possess a wide range of aero performance levels. Some intruders may be cooperative (i.e. are equipped with ADS-B) while others may be non-cooperative (detected and tracked through active or passive sensors only).
It is important to note that the present effort was not designed to evaluate JOCA system performance or the validity of its maneuver decisions. Rather this research focused on the design of an interface to provide pilots visibility into this SAA system' processing and the ability to interact with it.
EXPERIMENTAL SAA INTERFACES
Given that multi-UAS control by a single operator is envisioned for future applications, the present SAA interface was designed with two JOCA systems (Version 2.2) instantiated in the simulation, one for each of two UASs. The AMASE simulation (Figure 1) Duquette, 2011 ) that ran on a single Dell Precision PWS690 with dual 2.66 GHz Intel Xeon X5355 processors and 2.75 GB of RAM, with Windows 7 as the operating system for the PC. The PC also used a Nvidia Quadro FX 4600 Video Card and a Eurosys Picolo Jet-X Frame Grabber. The control station interface was displayed on two 24" widescreen Dell LCD monitors (resolution 1920 x 1200). Participants interacted with the control station via a mouse and keyboard and spoke to a confederate air traffic controller (ATC) via a microphone mounted on a headset that enabled two-way communications.
Map Display and Vehicle Control
The left most monitor provided a map with several "no fly zones" highlighted with red shading near a road (denoted by a green line) to be imaged by two UASs. Planned paths for each UAS were depicted, color-coded by UAS (teal and magenta; see Figure 1 ). Stick and throttle vehicle control was deemed impractical for a multi-UAS scenario. Therefore, participants could re-vector the route of any UAS via direct interaction with each UAS ownship's symbology on the map (see Figure  2 ). Hovering the mouse over a UAS symbol called up a compass rose. A click of the left mouse button created a vector arrow to be displayed indicating the current heading of the UAS. Dragging this vector with the mouse to a different position on the compass rose and then releasing the vector commanded a new heading to the respective UAS. Alternatively, a click of the right mouse button called up an adjacent menu by which numbers could be entered to command a different heading and/or altitude, following by selection of "Send command." This menu included features to control JOCA state, described next. 
JOCA State
The interface was designed to support three JOCA states: 1) JOCA return to path (UAS either on or returning to the planned flight path), 2) JOCA avoidance on (UAS actively avoiding an intruder), and 3) JOCA overridden by the operator (either the operator is re-vectoring the UAS using the commands described earlier or has selected "Return to path" on the pop-up menu, triggering the flight management system to re-route the UAS back to the path, without regard to any intruder data). It is important to note that the JOCA SAA system continued to keep processing intruder data during all states, but only made active inputs to the UAS's flight path in the first two states described above. Also, whenever the JOCA state was overridden by the participant, a timer was initiated, and if more than 45 s had elapsed and JOCA detected an intruder, then the JOCA system automatically returned to the JOCA avoidance on state ("automatic reengagement").
Systems information for each UAS was also provided (e.g., altitude, speed, heading, fuel) at the top of the panel to the right of the map. At the bottom of this panel, a horizontal bar for each UAS was provided that was labelled and colorcoded to denote JOCA state. If JOCA was overridden by the operator, the respective bar was gray: either labelled "Operator Override" (UAS manually re-vectored via map) or "JOCA disabled" (the "Return to path" option selected on the map pop-up to employ the flight management system instead). Otherwise, the button was either yellow or green. A yellow bar with the words "JOCA AVOIDANCE ON" indicated that JOCA was automatically changing the UAS's path to avoid a conflict. A green bar labelled "JOCA RETURN TO PATH" indicated that collision avoidance maneuvering was not required and the UAS was either on or returning to path. 
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Two JOCA SAA Interface Prototypes
The above describes the "Basic" prototype referred to as "JOCA 1" to participants. Participants were aware of JOCA's state for each UAS from the bars in the middle panel as well as watching the movement of the respective UAS symbols. Participants could override the SAA with selections on the popup menu on the map or re-vectoring one or both UASs.
With the "JOCA 2" interface (termed here as "Augmented"), the same observability and directability features of the Basic SAA interface were provided. However, additional symbology was provided in the Augmented interface to provide more visibility into the SAA algorithm (Figure 3) . One element was referred to as a "worm" that emanated from the UAS symbol: its path indicated the JOCA's planned maneuver (30 s ahead) and its color depicted the JOCA state (similar to color of JOCA status bar). A "minimum separation" ring around the UAS ownship symbol denoted the limit of the conflict zone (820 ft horizontal; 500 ft vertical); intruders entering this "ring" were "in conflict" with the UAS. As a warning, this ring (as well as the intruder symbol) turned red whenever an intruder's current track was within 45 s of being in conflict with one or both of the UASs. Thus, the Augmented version provided additional feedback on JOCA state, planned maneuver, and when a conflict was detected. 
METHOD Experimental Design
A 2 x 2 x 2 within-subject design was utilized to examine JOCA interface version (Basic, Augmented) as a function of simulated airspace (military, civilian; see next page) with two repeated trials. Trial order was blocked by interface with participants completing four trials with one interface before the alternate prototype (order counterbalanced across participants). Within JOCA blocks, trials were blocked by airspace type (two trials with each airspace), with airspace order counterbalanced across participants. Two intruder ratios were employed (2/3 cooperative and 2/3 uncooperative; ratios were randomly assigned across trials such that each combination of JOCA interface, airspace environment, and intruder ratio occurred an equal number of times across participants' trials).
Experimental Participants
Eight U.S. Air Force male employees served as participants (mean age = 48.5 years, SD = 7.65 years). The volunteers consisted of three UAS pilots (2 MQ-1 and 1 Global Hawk), two pilots (mainly commercial aircraft), one military pilot (F-117/F-111), one private pilot with extensive military navigator experience, and 1 with extensive Air Battle Management experience. All reported having vision correctable to 20/20, normal color vision, and normal hearing.
Experimental Tasks
In each 10-minute trial, participants monitored two UASs performing surveillance of a road for targets. The specific tasks were (listed from highest to lowest priority): avoid intruder aircraft conflicts, avoid UAS flight into no fly zones, detect white jeeps in the UASs' imagery, minimize error deviations from the original planned flight path, and minimize time to complete the mission. Except for the imagery target detection, all the tasks involved exercising the SAA systems and/or the UAS map-based re-vectoring interface efficiently in order to avoid intruder conflicts and no fly zones, while minimizing the deviation from flight paths (good performance in the latter would be reflected in smaller RMS error from flight path and faster completion time).
The target detection task involved monitoring continuous video imagery (right monitor) from each of the two UASs and positioning (and right clicking) the mouse on any white jeep detected (Figure 4 ). An aural "ding" was presented with each designation, regardless of accuracy, similar to operational systems. Success was measured as a right mouse click that corresponded to points within 100 ft of the target symbol. The sensor imagery's zoom could be changed (mouse wheel) and centered on a point (left click).
Figure 4. Sample of target detection task in imagery.
In addition to the tasks described above, participants were also required to communicate over the headset with an ATC (an experimenter confederate seated in a separate testing room). For both scenarios (military and civilian Class E), the participant informed the controller of path changes for both UASs. In trials completed with a civilian scenario, the controller also gave separation notifications and verbal alerts for 4 or 5 of the 9 possible conflicts per trial (e.g., "call sign #, Indi center, be advised traffic at your 12 o'clock for 2 miles heading 090"). In both military and civilian simulated scenarios, the participant also heard a steady stream of prerecorded communications between the ATC and four other aircraft with distinct call signs.
Experimental Scenarios
The starting positions and routes for the two UASs in each experimental scenario were such that they would not collide during trials. Per each 10-minute trial, scenarios were scripted to present targets in the imagery windows 18 times and to introduce 9 intruders on the map in a manner that anticipated conflicts would represent a range of geometries, speeds, and numbers of intruders.
The two simulated airspace environments and number of intruders employed for these experimental scenarios were intentionally more demanding than envisioned NAS operational environments in order to increase participants' exposure to the prototypes under time constrained trials.
Symbology denoting intruders had predictive vector headings, history trails, altitude readouts (feet above ground) and trend indicators (plus sign: climbing, minus: diving). Cooperative intruders (those detected with ADS-B sensors) were represented by diamonds and uncooperative ones (detected with EO/radar) were represented by circles ( Figure  5 ). Cooperative intruders were detected by both UASs, while uncooperative could be detected by both, only one, or neither UAS. The color of a ring around the uncooperative intruder matched the sensory inputs for the UASs (2 colors for both UASs, a solid color for one UAS; intruder symbol ghosted out over 10 s if detection was lost for both UASs). 
Procedures
Participants were seated at the simulation located in a private testing room with one experimenter. Training began with an explanation of the simulation's displays and controls, communication procedures with the ATC, and the avoidance criteria utilized by the JOCA algorithm. Next, the mission was described and practiced in a single-UAS environment, using the conditions assigned for the first trial block. This was followed by a series of multi-UAS training trials. Training continued until target detection reached 60%. This portion of training took approximately 45 min to complete and was followed by the conduct of two 10-minute experimental trials with the assigned JOCA and airspace conditions. Participants then completed 2 experimental trials with the same JOCA condition but with the alternate airspace condition. After each experimental trial, participants completed experimenter developed Likert-type rating scales addressing perceived task performance, trust in JOCA, and impact of the JOCA interface on performance. After each JOCA block, participants completed a questionnaire with similar rating scales assessing their strategy for interacting with JOCA, adequacy of the automation's visibility, and the effects of intruder type and airspace on performance. Similar procedures were used for the JOCA interface assigned for the second trial block. A postexperiment questionnaire was administered with similar rating scales, as well as questions addressing each symbology element and comparing the two JOCA interfaces. The entire session time was approximately 4 hours per participant.
RESULTS/DISCUSSION

Objective Performance Data
Performance data for each of the participants' tasks were analyzed with an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) model. For the measures related to performance on managing UASs' flight paths (deviation (RMS error) from flight path, time to complete flight path, and frequency and duration of no fly zone breaches), none of the ANOVAs indicated a significant difference in performance as a function of JOCA interface, airspace type, or cooperative ratio (F < 1, generally). Results on target detection performance were also similar across interfaces and airspace type. However, performance for target detection in UAS 1's imagery was better than that for UAS 2's imagery in terms of detecting about 2 more targets/trial and having less RMS error deviation from flight path (F(1,7) = 20.84, p < .01 and F(1,7) = 20.84, p < .01, respectively). This probably reflects the fact that UAS 1's imagery was in a more prominent (top) location in the simulation, and participants paid more attention to its imagery and flight path.
In terms of the frequency and time spent in conflict violations, performance was similar with both JOCA interfaces and cooperative ratios. Performance on both measures was better, though, for the civilian airspace compared to the military (F(1,7) = 5.6, p = .05 & F(1,7) = 6.34, p < .05, respectively), probably reflecting the benefit of the ATC alerting participants to potential conflicts. Participants also turned JOCA off more frequently in the civilian airspace (F(1,7) = 9.99, p < .05) and were observed to be more likely to make quick vector changes with the additional advanced threat alerts from the ATC. The time spent with JOCA turned off (averaged less than 2 min per 10 min trial) did not significantly differ as a function of any of the experimental variables.
Subjective Data
Subjective data were analyzed with the KolmogorovSmirnov nonparametric test of significance. Despite the small sample size, there were statistically significant differences across responses for two questionnaire items. First, participants indicated that their ability to maintain safe separation from other aircraft was either slightly (n=3) or substantially (n=5) higher with the JOCA interface that was augmented with the worm, min separation circle, and threat detection cue symbology compared to the Basic JOCA interface (D(8) = .6, p < .01). Similarly, participants rated their ability to maintain situation awareness (knowledge of UAS and mission state and ability to anticipate/accommodate trends) as slightly (n=4) or substantially (n=4) higher with the Augmented JOCA interface compared to the Basic (D(8) = .6, p < .01). Ratings for other questions were also more favorable for the Augmented versus the Basic interface including: ability to minimize deviations from UAS planned path (6 of 8 participants), ability to detect targets in the imagery (5 of 8), and less mental workload required (6 of 8). Additionally, the Augmented JOCA interface was preferred over the Basic for both military and civilian airspace (6 of 8 participants for both simulated environments; the other 2 participants responded 'no preference').
Other questionnaire items addressed specific features of the simulation and symbology elements used in the interfaces. Seven participants indicated that the concept demonstration and scenarios were adequate for evaluating interface concepts involving SAA automation, while the eighth pointed out that the scenarios were not representative of airspace environments (e.g., excessive number of intruders per minute), but that the extreme tasking did help in addressing needed SAA issues.
Some participants commented to consider quicker methods for adjusting UAS airspeed, as that is an effective means of deconflicting traffic. Additionally, participants suggested adding a voice input method for manual vectoring, a "level-off" option, and a 3-D display to show altitude changes. All but one participant found the usability of the map-based interface for vectoring UAS as at least 'satisfactory'. All eight participants found the map-based vectoring and the "Return to JOCA" button on the pop-up menu 'useful'; seven rated the "Return to Path" option to be at least 'some use'.
The Augmented interface included additional symbology that participants indicated was a benefit. Most found the worm useful for minimizing deviations from the ATC corridor and its update rate (1 HZ) 'about right'. One commented that this predictive element "allowed me to see what JOCA was thinking and intervene earlier if JOCA was going to do something I did not like". All eight participants rated the minimum separation circles as useful, especially when it changed color upon threat detection. Ratings were mixed on the value of the auto reengage feature; however, more data is needed as it was seldom triggered.
With respect to the symbology denoting intruder aircraft, all eight participants rated the "predictive vector" (emanating from the intruder symbol to depict predicted hearing), red coding upon conflict detection, and the altitude trend indicator (plus or minus) as at least 'some use'. Most participants rated the use of diamond versus circle shapes to differentiate cooperative from uncooperative intruder as useful, as well as the gradual ghosting of uncooperative intruder symbols when lost by the UASs. In contrast, participants were divided about the usefulness of the "bread crumb" trail behind the intruder symbol and the color-coded circle for uncooperative intruders. Other comments included: changing the vector length to also indicate intruder speed, round the altitude readout to 100s unit, add a black box around the readout to increase saliency, and change altitude trend symbols to match TCAS symbology (up and down arrows).
CONCLUSION
The present evaluation investigated human-automation interaction associated with the integration of an SAA (JOCA) system with a multi-UAS control simulation. The results did not show performance differences between the two interfaces. Note, that the conflicts were fairly easy to resolve so that the augmented features may not have been required to "see" the situation. Also, the task load was minimal. With a more complex and taxing scenario, it is anticipated that participants would rely on an augmented SAA system more and have less spare capacity to attend to imagery tasks. Indeed, the questionnaire ratings indicated that participants' ability to maintain safe separation and their overall situation awareness was better with the interface that presented symbology to show JOCA's planned maneuver and when a conflict was detected. These results are aligned with the benefit of supporting observability and directability for humanautomation coordination (Woods & Hollnagel, 2006) .
The present effort also provided valuable participant comments on how the interface could be improved further. Additionally, it is recommended that the interface be expanded to increase the operator's visibility into the processing of the SAA algorithm (e.g., which avoidance rules are violated versus satisfied). More importantly, research is needed to determine efficient means for enabling the operator to interact more with the SAA algorithm, without negatively impacting overall workload and situation awareness. The present interface was limited: participants could only override the SAA system. Possible additional methods to enhance directability include the ability to delay a SAA-commanded maneuver, select which avoidance rules can be violated, specify avoidance rule priorities/values (e.g., change wellclear distance setting), specify avoidance maneuver types and parameters (e.g., max bank angle or make vertical adjustments only), and specify the range to use for trajectory generations.
